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A.
Fusion-Fission Hybrid Fuel Cycle
The principal components of a fusion-fission The plutonium-fueled LWR is identical to the design used for the fusion-fission hybrid cycle described above.
c.
Systems Integration Model
A key feature of this analysis is that the evaluation encompasses total, "This parameter represents that fraction of the uranium energy which can ultimately be delivered to the electrical distribution system. Because it is expressed as a fraction of the uranium resource, it will not change as resource estimates are revised and updated.
Results of the energy analysis are presented in Table IV If so, hybrids should be investigated further. Another term is added to the capital cost to account for the complexity, and therefore the high cost, of the fusion driver. There is also the possibility that a system will not achieve the performance levels postulated in our description of it. In the discussion that follows we will examine potential performance parameter variations that could significantly alter the attractiveness of each cycle.
TABLE IV ENERGY ANALYSIS RESULTS
LWR-OT
The continued health of the LWR-OT cycle is most strongly dependent on a continuing supply of uranium. Clearly, this cycle would benefit greatly from the discovery of new uranium deposits, but there are also improvements to the cycle itself which would enhance its uranium utilization. VII.
INSTITUTIONAL ISSUES
Implementation of a new energy system inevitably depends on a number of legal, political, and social factors.
For nuclear energy technologies the
most important of these are weapons proliferation and public first two sections below, we will examine each of these issues the third, we will discuss the effect that these and other have on the commercial potential of competing fuel cycles.
A. Proliferation
In recent years, there has been a resurgence of concern safety. In the
separately. In questions might in this country
over the spread of nuclear weapons. Inevitably, attention has focused on the nuclear proliferation potential in the peaceful nuclear fuel cycle. For the purpose of this discussion, we define proliferation as:
the misuse of peaceful nuclear facilities, skills or materials to assist in the acquisition of a nuclear weapons capability.
Our chief concern is proliferation by national governments.
No nuclear fuel cycle can be proliferation-proof, but some systems are more resistant to this type of abuse than others.
In our analysis of proliferation-resistance, we apply three criteria to each fuel cycle. First, we examine the proliferation risks associated with each system.
Second, we
enumerate the barriers which would be necessary to mitigate these risks.
Finally, we examine the ways in which a potential proliferator might be able to misuse the fuel cycle. Having enumerated all of these characteristics, we search for patterns which might make one fuel system more conducive to proliferation than another. 
Proliferation
Risks.
There is a wide variety of nuclear material present in nuclear fuel systems.
We have classified each material according to the degree of difficulty involved in converting it to nuclear explosives grade (Table VI) .
Material directly usable for weapons production, such as pure plutonium Resource requirements. Operation of the Reactors.
In the years to come electric utility companies are likely to be more reluctant to purchase nuclear reactors. Although the hybrid is indeed superior in some respects, it also has some drawbacks. Furthermore, as is always the case with an untested concept, there is the possibility that unforeseen problems will emerge as the technology becomes better understood.
Rising capital
In the face of an already commercialized fast breeder reactor, there is not sufficient incentive, in our opinion, to demonstrate and commercialize the fusion-fission hybrid.
